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Exposed Body and the Spectacle of Virtuality
In the meantime, there are five billion 
human bodies. Soon, there will be eight 
billion. Not to say anything of the other 
bodies. Humanity is becoming tangible, 
and also tangible in its inhumanity. 
What is the space opened between eight 
billion bodies? What is the space in 
which they touch or draw apart, with­
out any of them or their totality being 
resorbed into a pure and nil sign of 
itself? Sixteen billion eyes, eighty bil­
lion fingers: to see what, to touch 
what?1
1 Jean-Luc Nancy, "Corpus, ” in The Birth to Presence, trans. Claudette Sartiliot 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 196-197.
2 Cultures of Internet: Virtual Spaces, Real Histories, Living Bodies, ed. Rob 
Shields (London: Sage, 1996), pp. 116-117; the reference in the quotation is to 
Pamela Kane, Hitchhiker ’s Guide to the Electronic Highway (New York: MIS 
Press, 1994).
Boardwatch magazine’s Jack Richard 
estimates that 50,000 people now en­
gage daily in cybersex using up to 700 
real-time chat lines (Kane 1994: 21). 
The main problem they face is not being 
able to type quickly enough, especially 
with one hand.1 2
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Two quotations, two spaces, so incomparable. Both open territo­
ries of the body’s attempt to take itself beyond itself; both describe 
the situation of unfulfilment. But do we speak of anxiety in any of 
these cases, the anxiety brought over by the process of alienation? 
Doesn’t it rather seem that the incompatibility of the fields opened 
by the above quotations indicate that thinking in such terms is 
precisely what is escaping from the horizon of thought today? What 
happened and whence the incomparability? What follows is an at­
tempt to trace the division that separates these two experiences, the 
division that constitutes our contemporary experience of the body, 
its space, weight, resistance or its lack...
Glancing backwards historically, one can clearly see how the 
philosophical problem of the body (which, if one looks closer, al­
ways turns out to be the problem of the body of the philosopher) 
has become displaced in our contemporary world.
The body of the Platonic cave was never really a problem, because 
it had always been recognised as a cadaver, living death in the power 
of obscure forces of Mother Earth, whose most secret and at the same 
time most visible sign was corruption - secretive mystery of the 
telluric belly. For the philosopher, his body was precisely what was 
left behind at the moment of the philosopher’s birth as the philoso­
pher. Yet coming to life in such a way meant being born of the dead 
matter (telluric origination) and the discharge of this not-so-pure 
a spirit from the gestating belly of the mother cave-belly constituted 
a potent metaphor of this ambivalent transubstantiation.
Philosophic technology of modernity turned the body into the 
animal-machine. In the world given to rationalistic thinking the body 
is still dead, as a mechanism is dead. This kind of death, however, 
no longer implicates any threat coming from beyond the body (as in 
the case of telluric and therefore “magical” powers). Rational train­
ing is supposed to make the body the perfect tool of reason and science 
begins to empower such a tool with extensions of which the telescope 
and the microscope can be seen as the most paradigmatic. But there 
is irony waiting at the end of this road pursued by modernity, whose 
project is to discipline the rational body and make its functioning strict: 
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the servant of reason “magically” disappears on the way to its mas­
tering - modern physics does not operate in the world analogous to 
the body of senses, most of the molecular processes can be described 
only mathematically, that is, by purely formal language of categories 
of the mind. Hence the famous question asked by some analytic 
philosophers about the relationship between the table (or the body) 
of our everyday experience and the table (or the body) of modem 
physics. But is it really an analytic question? Doesn’t it smack of some 
“tellurism”? Shouldn’t it be asked rather differently?
What happens to the body and its telluric threat when it disappears 
from the terrain of modern science? It takes the place of religion as 
art. A very interesting metamorphosis comes to pass here: science 
binds itself to the earth rationalising its resources and leaving all 
“magic” and transcendence beyond the pale, but it can only do it by 
relegating the body - in which, as we have noticed, both earth and 
transcendence are inseparably bound together - to the realm of 
artistic activity which towards the end of the 18th century begins to 
take the place of religious experience. What is exorcised from the 
realm of scientific truth is basically “the life of the senses,” as far 
as it goes beyond schématisation and rationalisation of mathemat­
ics. But, paradoxically, it was not the truth of science that provided 
the model of the life worth living for the European educated classes 
of the 19th century - although technology changed the circumstances 
of life substantially, it was art that provided the codes of behaviour 
and values from the Romantics until at least this belated monument 
of the belle époque, Proust’s Remembrance of the Things Past. It is 
the aesthetic experience that accommodates transcendence through­
out this epoch, but although it is often discussed in religious terms, 
the aesthetic experience is the experience of “the life of the senses” 
and therefore of the body in transcendence.3
3 In a text devoted to the role of the body in music (to be published soon) 
I write:
[TJhe communicative site of music is neither the body-object nor “hidden” 
behind it, it displays itself across the dimensions of the signifying body. While 
a body sign always says: “My true infinite self is behind the sign you see,
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However, as the body, step by step, reaches its obsolescence in 
science, the discourse of art slowly continues in the same direction: 
art as science becomes more and more desensitised.I *4 What takes 
centre stage in artistic practices of late 19th and early 20th centuries 
is experimentation in a close to scientific sense: to perform exhaus­
tively what it is possible to do with given materials. In order to do 
that, one cannot avoid rationalising one’s artistic discourses. Prob­
ably the best illustration here is Schonberg’s twelve tone system and 
its mathematical structures (or Milton Babbitt’s music in the second 
half of the 20th century), but one can also name a lot of other ex­
amples of major artists and practices fitting the bill, e.g.: Marcel 
Duchamp as the father of conceptual art or severing the link between 
the word and the world by Mallarmé. Thus science and art led by 
the same urge to uncover the immutable laws of the universe as its 
disembodied truth become “autonomous,” that is, desensitised, which 
results in their being accessible only to the narrow group of special­
ists who know their autonomous codes that are completely alien to 
the “ordinary people,” because such codes have nothing to do with 
their life, since the world for them is the world of senses, of praxis 
as sensual engagement with all that comes their way. Becoming 
science, art lost the position it held in the 19th century of actually 
influencing the life of Western societies, since it became incompre­
hensible and inaccessible even to those who wanted to participate, 
but could not cope with the new codes (specialisation demands lots 
I am deep down inside here and the surface that is the sign is only an allegory
that I adopt from the resources of a code,” the transcending body has no depth,
it hides no secrets, it is the obvious itself, yet, at the same time, it is the essence 
of the unexpected. It is always on the outside with others, communicating. As 
long as there is the body in music, even the abstracted concert hall system is 
liable to surrender to it [...] - a good singer or instrumentalist is able to bring 
his or her own body to the audience’s cars while performing. In one sense the 
19th-century religion of music was right (although, paradoxically, a materialist 
dialectician as Adorno would scorn at such dictum): in the concert hall, tran­
scendence would sometimes have taken place, yet it was not the Infinite that 
visited the wretched flock, the visitor was the experience of sharing which made 
one burst with oneself.
4 Arnold Gehlen, Man in the Age of Technology, trans. Patricia Lipscomb (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 20—40.
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of time).5 That is how what is nowadays called popular culture has 
taken over (its close affinity with certain type of Romantic art 
notwithstanding6) and how the desensitised body has come back with 
vengeance: on the pop market the overload of chaotic sensual infor­
mation makes the telluric body oscillate in the mediatic space making 
no sense of the body of senses and this way losing the body again.
5 Ibidem.
6 See: Herman Broch, “Einige Bemerkungen zum Problem des Kitsches,” in 
Kommentierte Werkausgabe in 13 Bänden, ed. Paul Michael Lützeler (Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1975, 1977), Vol. 9.
7 Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time (New York: Bantham Books, 1988), 
Chapter 4.
8 Stefan Breuer, Die Gesellschaft des Verschwindens (Hamburg: Junius, 1992), 
pp. 166-172.
Yet the desensitisation of science is not just the desensitisation of 
the number as the abstraction of the world of senses. The world of 
modern physics, the world beyond senses, does not obey the rules 
of the world of senses, as it is proved by e.g. quantum mechanics. 
It is the world which cannot be completely calculated, as 
Heisenberg’s law of indetermination demonstrates (the more accu­
rately the speed of a particle is measured, the less accurate the 
measurement of its position, etc.). Quantum mechanics does not 
allow to anticipate the result of one particular measurement, instead 
it applies statistical laws, which provide the class of possible results 
and estimate the probability of each of them. The result is omnipres­
ent accidentality and unpredictability.7 In high velocity processes it 
is useless to try to measure the precise amount of energy spent, so 
the law of conservation of energy does not hold. Light as possess­
ing two natures at once (wave and particle) puts into question the 
law of identity of formal logic. The particles like mesons turn into 
one another or even appear out of the vacuum, which begs the old 
onto-theological question of distinction between nothing and some­
thing.8
That which was inaccessible to human senses and impossible to 
predict has always been defined as strictly speaking inhuman: the 
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Sacred. Moreover, it has always had another characteristics connected 
to the ones already mentioned: it was impossible to tame and always 
threatened, its attack was always unexpected. The more one tried to 
make use of it, the more sneaky it became. This corresponds per­
fectly to what happens in our technological world today: the more 
we try to tame it, by means of the religion of science, the bigger 
the number of unexpected, unplanned threats, the greater possible 
catastrophe looms in front of us. The anxiety we feel is not really 
rational, it is rather our irrational reaction to the dangers of unspeci­
fied category, which it is impossible to place anywhere in particu­
lar, because many aspects of our technological world are strictly 
speaking unimaginable to a non-specialist in a given field, lacking 
any reference to the world of senses, as is the case with e.g. radio­
activity or the destruction of ozone layer, not to mention the global 
market (also the technological product, this time of information 
technology).9 The Sacred is an impenetrable power impossible to be 
manhandled and all attempts to do it result in the escalation of 
catastrophe and multiplication of dangers. Is not such situation - 
remember the ancient tragedies? - our own in the face of nuclear 
energy, climatic changes or genetics (not to mention the world 
economy again)? But nowadays the Sacred, paradoxically, spreads 
by means of rationalisation and objectification, taking advantage of 
the laws of reason. As a caustic remark by Stefan Breuer has it, in 
the particle accelerator the reality beyond senses is present in pure 
form as God in the cathedral. Wouldn’t the philosophers of the 
Enlightenment be flabbergasted to find out that the science they 
practised against religious obscurantism will provide the tools of 
parousia or the appearance of the Sacred on earth?10 Doesn’t it look 
again as the return of the telluric repressed?
9 Hartmut Böhme, “Über die Unvorstellbarkeit der Gegenwart und den Verbleib 
des Menschen,” in Verneinungen, ed. Hermann Sturm (Essen: Klartext, 1989), 
pp. 123-141.
10 Breuer, Die Gesellschaft..., p. 170.
As one can see, from a certain perspective science largely suc­
ceeded where religion had failed and from many quarters one can 
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hear that technology (together with economy in the form of free 
world trade) will succeed where politics has failed, namely, in cre­
ating the communicative space open to everybody, silencing the 
voices of none and allowing for the maximum of personal freedom 
and self-realisation. This, of course, is the laudatory view on one of 
the most important grandchildren of quantum mechanics (and mili­
tary industry), that is, the Internet, the matrix or cyberspace." Sur­
prisingly, or perhaps not so surprisingly, one has to come back to 
the thematics of evacuation of the body here.
What is this trans-humanity in the mediatic or communicative 
sense? It seems to be the product of a certain promise of technology 
that promises spiritual transcendence of the body, time and space, 
which is at bottom a religious or, to be more precise, onto-theologi- 
cal promise (cf. Plato’s cave). The result of entering the matrix is 
supposed to be instantaneous empowerment and mastery over the 
above trinity (body-space-time): one can adopt and accommodate any 
identity one fancies at a given moment in the milieu in which space 
as distance, and with it the time necessary to cover it, cease to get 
in the way. Such self-enhancement has been elatedly described as 
transgression of the natural limits of humanity, trans-human in the 
sense of beyond-the-human as well as across-the-human, since the 
matrix is said to allow greater contact with others (“contacts with 
others are enriching”) and greater knowledge of oneself (it allows 
adoption and trying out of many personae). Communication is said 
to be better than ever and in a sense it is, but one has to be more 
precise as to what communication means in such circumstances. The 
answer could be: the exchange of messages and images. But under­
standing it in such a way makes it fetishised communication, that 
is, the accomplished incarnation, in the social-mediatic reality, of 
what Heidegger, speaking about technological approach to the “natu­
ral world,” called Ge-stell.n *
" Certain distinctions have been drawn between these three terms, but they are 
of no consequence to this text.
12 “Enframing” and the presence of the frame-screen in our context is definitely 
not accidental.
2 The (Trans)Human...
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Enframing (Ge-stell) means the gathering together of that setting- 
upon which sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal 
the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve (Bestand). 
Enframing means that way of revealing which holds sway in the 
essence of modern technology and which is itself nothing tech­
nological.13
13 Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in The Question 
Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: 
Harper Colophon Books, 1977), p. 20.
14 Ibidem.
A very similar enframing as the “mobilisation of resources”14 takes 
place in the matrix: everybody and everything in the Internet is my 
resource and I present myself there as the resource for others, as an 
abstracted image on somebody’s screen, with whom one may or may 
not engage without any risk or consequences. That means no real 
surprise or resistance: there are no “accidents” in the matrix, eve­
rything there is intentional, so all resistances are only pseudo­
resistances, that is, pre-programmed ones as in a computer game 
where my activities and the programme’s resistance to them are 
guided by the pre-established pattern always in control and there­
fore predictable.
Such “liberated” experience of sociality undoubtedly strongly 
influences the way people act, think about themselves, their life, etc. 
It induces a very popular contemporary mind-frame: on the one hand, 
the feeling of isolation from my immediate surroundings (both in 
social and geographical senses), because it is easier to relate myself 
to others in the matrix, which delivers me from all the “messy” 
consequences of the real-life engagement that I cannot control, while 
at the same time (and as a consequence of the above) I feel unhappy 
and diminished in the space I live in, all of which results in the 
atomised society of anxious monads; on the other hand, dreams of 
power and narcissistic grandiose self set loose to become anything 
in the matrix, to perform any atrocity or heroic deed within the 
bounds of the virtual world. Here, anxiety and narcissism are the two 
sides of the same coin: the more everyday social space is 
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compartmentalised and inaccessible, the stronger the need to let 
oneself loose in the matrix, which leads to the more severe shrink­
ing of the social and the ever bigger need to compensate for that in 
the virtual space - the vicious circle closes upon itself.15 Therefore, 
one should ask whether technology should constitute the model for 
politics. Should the trans-human be thought along technological 
lines?
15 Obviously, the matters are much more complicated than that, because atomi­
sation is not only, or even not primarily, self-inflicted, as it has been suggested 
above. There are political and, above all, economic forces that cause it, but there 
is no place here for such analysis.
16 Zygmunt Bauman, Globalisation: the Human Consequences (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1998), Chapter 1.
2*
The answer here would be the emphatic no, because what is at 
stake in the politics of the mobilisation of resources is just bare 
mastery. What one comes across in it is the reversed Master-Slave 
relationship, not even dialectics, of Hegel. In the analyses of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit what makes the Master is his willingness 
to risk his life in order to prevail. But in the matrix it is precisely 
the ability to escape all risks that makes the Master: one can al­
ways withdraw and avoid the “real-life” consequences of one’s 
activities, especially if the other is unable to behave the same way, 
because its access to cyberspace is limited or none. The most 
obvious example here could be the relationship between specula- 
tive-exterritorial-virtual capital and the industrial production tied 
to its “material basis;” the former can take flight at any moment 
(e.g. stock-market panic) and leave the ruined national economy 
to lick its wounds.16
Taking the above into consideration, one can say that nothing ever 
takes place in the matrix, because there has to be a place in order 
for something to take place and a place can be opened only in one 
way, by what Heidegger called Dasein, yet not exactly in the sense 
of “being-there,” as it is usually translated, but, more precisely, 
“being-the-there,” the disclosure of Dasein and Being, 
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being an “each time” of this disclosure, in such a way that no 
disclosure would take place (no Being) if the one “disclosed” did 
not disclose itself with regard to an other “disclosed.” Disclosure 
itself consists only in the coincidence of disclosures. To-be-the- 
there is not to disclose a place to Being as Other: it is to disclose/ 
be disclosed to/through the plurality of singular disclosures.17
17 Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, trans. Robert D. Richardson and Anne 
E. O’Byrne (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 82.
The disclosure here is not of Being as the Other of everybody’s 
singularity, but as the taking place and disclosure of singularity as 
an “each time” of time and place-space which can be accomplished 
only in bodily disclosure, as a surfacing of resistant and disclosing 
bodily mass or weight. It is the body that opens space and time in 
its praxis of energy spending.
There is no place in the matrix, because what is done within the 
limits of a code is not a praxis: the code is always encoded, pre­
coded, sup-posed. As it has already been said, the code offers only 
pseudo-resistance, the resistance that has been prepared in advance. 
The code is a perfect realisation of mastery, because it is perfectly 
controllable and predictable, it offers no contingencies and therefore 
no risks. But this is precisely its point of failure: without contingency 
it offers no real differences. In order to provide them, it would have 
to transgress its own rules and this is precisely what it cannot do 
without destroying itself. Although cyberspace is in many ways an 
“excessive” phenomenon in which body-time-space seem to be tran­
scended, this is only a facile excess of images. The point is that in 
the matrix, body-time-space become reduced to their own 
simulations, that is, representations the infinite multiplication of 
which causes the feeling of pseudo-excess that one can, in different 
ways, come across in the analyses of both Kant and Baudrillard: the 
great speed and multiplication of images break down the bounda­
ries of the subject, yet the effect is far from liberatory - all this results 
in inertia-fascination that freezes one in monadic limbo of the in­
finitely multiplied sameness. Excess means noting if it does not start 
in the disclosure of the body, its exposure, and such body has no 
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image because it always reaches beyond itself, as it is constituted 
as co-appearance, a coincidence of multiplied disclosures that open 
the world, the originary differentiality of time and space. One does 
not have a body, one is a body in the fullest possible sense of this 
word, the imageless body, the body - my body - but the body as 
given to me without becoming a thing I own, without being reap­
propriated through the representation that other bodies are for me18, 
undifferianted weight, mass; the body with no representation super­
imposed on it, no the mechanistic body of reason, but the body 
without organs, if organs are functional parts of the whole.19 Such 
body is the explosive deployment of energies that create and expose 
differences (emphatic plural) as originary, since an origin is the 
continual disclosure of being singular, an “each time” taking place 
and originating time and space.
18 Nancy, “Corpus...,” p. 199.
19 Ibidem, p. 203. “Body without organs” is of course Antonin Artaud’s image 
(cf. 84, November 1947, p. 102).
20 Nancy, Being Singular Plural..., pp. 82-83.
21 Ibidem, p. 82.
An origin is not an origin for itself; nor is it an origin in order 
to retain itself in itself (that would be the origin of nothing); nor 
is it an origin in order to hover over some derivative succession 
in which its being as origin would be lost. An origin is some­
thing other than a starting point; it is both a principle and an 
appearing; as such, it repeats itself at each moment of what it 
originates. It is “continual creation.”20
Because there is no difference “in general,” as difference is not the 
“juxta-position of in-differences”21 and, being an “each time,” the 
disclosure that opens and exposes the world is never one, in order 
for body-time-space to be, there has to be me more than one origin. 
To be, that is, to be the world, that is, to be in the world and there­
fore in time and space is to be many, to be divided.
Without this excessive origin without a starting point, that is, 
without bodies that originate time and space, there is no symbolic 
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logic (no notions of before, after, above, below, etc.) and therefore 
no signs. In this sense, there is no cyberspace beyond the body.
What happens in the matrix is simulation, that is, reduction of 
the body to a sign that can be subject to exchange. Such exchange 
of signs is commonly called communication, but in fact we are 
speaking here about a certain kind of sign fetishism. As in capi­
talist society a commodity becomes an alienated fetish from which 
its nature as the product and incarnation of social relations is 
effaced within the market economy, so the sign, although it origi­
nates in the body, becomes perceived as detached from it, even 
more, facilitating the escape from the body (in a pseudo-transcend­
ence). But such a sign is an impotent one, since the exchange of 
signs constitutes no praxis, actually, it tends to withhold it and 
induce the vertigo of fascination for the “silent majorities.” Com­
munication as the exchange of fetishised signs always turns out to 
be the ultimate narcissism without the subject. This is what our 
contemporary politics has turned into - a sterile discourse without 
substance which wants to substantiate itself by means of project­
ing ever new formal, inconsequential differences in order to keep 
up the exchange that it is.
The sign does not only originate in the body, as the sign is dif­
ferential, as it can be a sign only because there are other signs 
among which it takes its differential place (a solitary sign would 
destroy itself as sign), it is also a sign of the exposure of bodies 
to each other. The body is always among other bodies as an origin 
of difference of time and space. Of time: I never meet Tom, Dick, 
and Harry “in general,” but each time a different “incarnation” of 
each of them, in a different “mood,” in a different “state”22 and the 
same can be said about myself. Of space: space is not only per­
ceived differently by different people, it is itself differential as 
senses share themselves - our experience of space is the experi­
ence of our senses which cannot be “translated” into each other, 
they partially overlap, but they also get in the way of each other 
and therefore the experience of the senses is not the experience of 
22 Ibidem, p. 8.
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a whole, a sum of the senses but of the sharing of senses: togeth­
erness and separation at the same time.23 What is more, some senses 
share themselves within themselves: I do not only see space, I also 
hear it, smell it, touch it24... but I see it with two eyes and hear 
it with two ears of which each sees or hears differently (if only 
because it occupies a different place). All of this makes the expe­
rience and orientation of space possible.
23 Jean-Luc Nancy, “Sharing Voices,” in Transforming the Hermeneutic Con­
text, ed. Gayle L. Ormiston and Alan D. Schrift (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1990).
24 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 396.
25 Nancy, Being Singular Plural..., p. 155.
26 Ibidem, p. 56.
The bodies as plural origins are originally with one another. As 
an “each time” of an origin they are equal to themselves and equal 
to one another, that is, they have nothing in common with one 
another, yet this “nothing in common” is what they have in com­
mon. What I have in common with another wo/man is the fact of 
not being the same wo/man as her/him.25 In such a way bodies are 
exposed to each other as they always co-appear being with one 
another - being-one can only be understood by starting from being- 
with-one-another.26 Exposed bodies do not exchange because the 
traffic of signs in their relation-communication is displaced (yet not 
completely arrested), since what the body exposes in its opening of 
space and time is its and the other’s finitude which are equal with­
out being the same. I cannot recognise myself in the death of oth­
ers, their deaths do not create a homogenous we as: “we the mortal 
beings,” because death is not common to us all (your death is not 
mine, I cannot even imagine it along the same lines), and although 
my finitude is nothing (I cannot make a representation of it), yet it 
appears, but its appearance (which is not an image) demands rela­
tion as its possibility: I experience my finitude in the finitude of the 
other which is not my finitude (I am able to create an image of the 
dead other). So, to be more precise, as we have already said, finitude 
co-appears, since the appearance of death is impossible without the 
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other.27 The image “gets in the way” here, it exposes, but it is not 
subject to exchange, at least not in the fetishised sense that has been 
described above. Such “get-in-the-way” exposure destroys meaning, 
that is, the subject of exchange, and exposes the fact that the bodies 
originally un-exch?.nge28 (expose each other), providing the possi­
bility of recognition.
27 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, ed. P. Connor, trans. P. Connor 
et al. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p. 28.
28 Nancy, Being Singular Plural..., p. 90.
29 Maurice Blanchot, “Literature and the Right to Death,” in The Work of Fire, 
trans. Charlotte Mandel (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 323-324.
30 Lefebvre, The Production of Space..., pp. 254-255.
[Djeath speaks in me. My speech is a warning that at this very 
moment death is loose in the world, that it has suddenly appeared 
between me, as I speak, and the being I address: it is there 
between us at the distance that separates us, but this distance is 
also what prevents us from being separated, because it contains 
the condition for all understanding.29
The first signs at the dawn of humanity retained in themselves 
something of this telluric (!) “knowledge:” the frescos of Lascaux 
were hidden, they were supposed to remain out of sight, they were 
not subject to exchange, but the seat where exposure pierced and 
disclosed the fabric of the everyday life of signs.30 They were images 
but the images of their own destruction, of exposure and disclosure 
in which the unworking of death was incessantly hollowing their 
place.
It is often said that the exchange of signs, as the exchange of 
commodities, provides us with the blessing of mutual enrichment. 
But of course, as it is the case with the exchange of commodities, 
it is far from being the case: such economy of signs enriches the 
West, adding ever new signs to its omnivorous and eclectic reper­
tory, while all the others get ever poorer, dispossessed of their signs 
in the process of their commodification, colonised with Western 
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images they are not able to digest. There are also “three worlds” as 
far as symbolic power is concerned: fetishised, commodified signs 
can be stored in large quantities and the one who is able to do it 
heightens his power of mastery over representations, which is also 
the power of mastery over others. The eclectic power of “diversity” 
can also be overwhelming and confusing for the other due to speed 
and multiplicity of images.31 But the source of diversity is not os­
cillating speed but the opening of time and space by the body as the 
only source of singularity and therefore difference; only coming 
together of multiple origins as bodies can establish what can prop­
erly be called diversity. However, this would mean that diversity does 
not enrich anybody, because it always escapes us, as it is “nothing,” 
it eludes identification, it is irretrievable as a sign.32 Therefore, 
diversity is precisely what resists the spectacle of signs - the “spec­
tacle of diversity,” as the matrix is often described, is properly 
speaking contradiction in terms.
31 In return to onto-theology again: television, as Baudrillard analyses it, and, 
of course, the Internet, as the machines of parousia. Marinetti in the Futurist 
Manifesto says: “Time and space have died. We live in the absolute because we 
have created the eternal, omnipresent speed.”
32 Nancy, Being Singular Plural..., p. 151.
Of diversity, in a non-fetishised meaning of that term, no repre­
sentation can be made, but this does not mean that diversity is 
something “beyond this world,” as a regulative idea that cannot be 
realised only infinitely approached without any hope of incarnation. 
Although diversity is not a work, rather the unworking, yet it works 
and is always put to work as co-existence in time and space of the 
exposed bodies that co-appear and engage with each other in praxis, 
the un-exchange of explosive energies that the bodies are, between 
themselves and the world. This putting to work of difference is the 
only process that enables anything new to come into the world, 
something unexpected, something of consequence, but, at the same 
time, also having consequences, consequences measured by bodies 
in joy and suffering, and mindful of that. Only in such incarnated 
community, community without the image, and therefore a non­
communitarian one, diversity can appear as incarnated praxis, it 
26 Sławomir Masłoń
cannot do so in a pseudo-community of disembodied masters on the 
loose in the matrix able to transform themselves at will and slaves 
reduced to their bodies alone experiencing this exclusion as punish­
ment, because being punished by the consequences (e.g. economic) 
of free play of the forces the masters have unleashed and, as they 
are able to metamorphose within split second, hold in control. Not 
the community of the machines of parousia but the community that 
takes place and takes time, always takes time.
